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Abstract
This paper examines the quarter-ahead out-of-sample predictability of Brazil,
Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey credit spreads before and after the Lehman
Brothers' default. A model based on the country-specic credit spread curve
factors predicts no better than the random walk and slope regression bench-
marks. Model extensions with the global yield curve factors and with both global
and domestic uncertainty indicators notably outperform both benchmarks post-
Lehman. The nding that bond prices better reect fundamental information af-
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Keywords: Sovereign credit spreads; Emerging Markets; Out-of-sample predictability;
Term structure; Macroeconomic uncertainty.
JEL Classifications: F34; F15; F17.
Correspondence to: A.-M. Fuertes, Faculty of Finance, Cass Business School, City, University of London,
106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ.
yEmail: a.audzeyeva@keele.ac.uk
zEmail: a.fuertes@city.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Little is known about the out-of-sample, or real-time, predictability of sovereign credit
spreads in markets where investors are non-trivially exposed to default risk. Beyond academia,
lling this vacuum is important for several reasons. Accurate predictions of emerging market
sovereign credit spreads at various maturities are essential for pricing emerging market assets
and derivatives, and for international portfolio management. Understanding how domestic
and global factors aect future international borrowing costs enables emerging market bor-
rowers to develop better informed economic policies. Due to the systemic importance of the
emerging sovereign debt market, the construction of predictive models for emerging credit
spreads is relevant for nancial market regulators. This is borne out, for instance, by the
fact that the defaults of several Latin American and Asian governments (besides Russia)
during the 1990s and 2000s triggered global market turmoil. Moreover, the stock of tradable
emerging market debt has grown by 17% per annum since 2002 reaching 11.7 trillion U.S.
dollars in 2011 (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2012). This fast growth is partly because
emerging market bonds attracted large portfolio capital ows due to both their post-crisis
relatively favorable risk-return prole and the ultra low interest rates in advanced economies.
This paper contributes to the sparse literature on emerging sovereign bond yield pre-
diction with a comprehensive out-of-sample (OOS) predictive analysis. The aim of this
forecasting exercise is to examine two theoretically-motivated hypotheses that have not been
tested in the emerging market context as yet. Hypothesis 1 states that the current emerging-
market credit spread curve alone is a sucient statistic to predict future credit spreads. This
hypothesis is motivated by the rational expectations theory of the term structure of interest
rates of Sargent (1972) and Roll (1970). The Roll-Sargent theory, which builds on the sem-
inal contributions of Hicks (1939), Lutz (1940) and Muth (1961), contends that whatever
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expectations mechanism is at work about future interest rates, it exploits all the available
information. Thus motivated, our paper is the rst to test in the emerging-market debt
context the hypothesis that the spread curve contains all relevant information for predicting
future spreads because it eciently embeds rational expectations about future spreads.1
Thus we begin by constructing OOS forecasts from a parsimonious model that exploits
the information content of the current credit spread curve alone; namely, the predictors
are the current spread level, slope and curvature factors. To test Hypothesis 1, we deploy
a hierarchical modeling approach by which the baseline predictive regression is gradually
augmented with dierent types of global and country-specic macroeconomic predictors.
As a by-product, the test can uncover macroeconomic variables that enhance the spread-
curve-based predictions. In this regard, our aim is to advance the current knowledge on the
predictability of emerging-market credit spreads which has implications for their modeling.
We further conjecture that emerging market sovereign bond spreads became more aligned
with global/domestic fundamentals post-Lehman (Hypothesis 2). This second hypothesis is
inspired by the notion of wake-up call eects in nancial markets as originally put forward
by Goldstein et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2011). A wake-up call theory is proposed by
Ahnert and Bertsch (2015) using global coordination games. This theory predicts that in
normal (or calm) market conditions investors have weak incentives to acquire costly funda-
mental information about a market; consequently, the market prices may not fully reect
fundamentals. However, a crisis event in another market induces investors to acquire funda-
mental information about the rst market even if they perceive the two markets as unrelated
to each other. Following a branch of the empirical nance literature, we focus attention on
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 given that this event constitutes an
1Akin to the one-to-one relationship that exists between yields on pure discount bonds and current forward
interest rates for riskless bonds, credit spreads on defaultable bonds are linked to current forward spreads.
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important landmark of the late 2000s global nancial crisis (see e.g., Baskaya et al., 2017;
Ongena et al., 2015; Boyer, 2014). As the analysis in Eichengreen et al. (2012) highlights, it
was a salient event that signaled to investors the imminence of a global nancial crisis.
Our analysis is based on July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2015 data for four geographically
dispersed and relatively mature emerging markets: Brazil, Mexico (Latin America), the
Philippines (Asia) and Turkey (Eastern Europe). All four borrowers have entered the J.P.
Morgan EMBI+ sovereign emerging market bond index  a market benchmark for large,
frequently-traded US$ denominated bond issues  since the early 2000s. While the index is
dominated by Latin American sovereigns, Turkey and the Philippines are among a handful of
borrowers from other regions that still enter the index at the end of our sample period. Also,
from a practical perspective (i.e., for credit spread curve estimation purposes) the size of the
Eurobond markets in these four sovereigns aords a relatively large cross-section of bonds
throughout the sample period. The available cross-sections of bonds for other emerging
markets are much smaller, particularly, in the early part of the sample.
Among the selected countries, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey are large emerging market
economies and members of the G20 (Group of Twenty) forum; in addition, Brazil is a
BRICS country. Albeit the Philippines is a relatively small economy, not typically regarded
among major emerging markets, it is nevertheless identied by Goldman Sachs as a N11
(Next Eleven) country alongside Mexico and Turkey. The N11 group consists of emerging
market economies that have been predicted to follow the footsteps of the BRICS countries
in rivaling major developed economies (Goldman Sachs, 2007).
For each sovereign borrower, we collect at the weekly frequency cross-sections of bond
prices and use them to estimate the latent factors of the credit spread curve using the Nelson
and Siegel (1987) approach. Given the size of the cross-sections available, the parsimony of
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this approach is important to preserve degrees of freedom and achieve as much accuracy as
possible in the factor extraction. We test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 using OOS predictive
ability tests for the credit spread.2 The length in time into the future of the forecasts is one
quarter; namely, a h = 13 week horizon in the context of our sampling frequency.
We nd pervasive evidence that the emerging-market credit spread curve is not a sucient
statistic for OOS prediction of the quarter-ahead spread, against Hypothesis 1, as the baseline
model forecasts are no better than those from the random walk and credit-slope benchmarks.
Adding the global riskless yield curve information reduces signicantly the model's predictive
errors. The spread curve factors and the global riskless yield curve factors together with the
volatility of the riskless short-term interest rate make a better predictive model that is able to
beat the benchmarks for both short- and long-term bonds. Domestic fundamentals further
enhance the model predictive ability across the bond maturity spectrum. Another novel
nding is that indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty, namely, the volatility of the U.S.
short-term interest rate, the volatility of the emerging-market sovereign trade balance and
terms-of-trade growth are useful predictors of the emerging-market spread. These results
provide insights for rening extant structural and reduced-form models of emerging-market
sovereign debt (Gibson and Sundaresan, 2005; Due et al., 2003; Pan and Singleton, 2008).
Comparing two periods of equal 5-year length surrounding the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers, we nd evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2 (the wake-up call eect). The predictive
ability of most global and domestic macroeconomic indicators becomes stronger in the 5-
year period following this salient event which suggests that credit spreads became then more
closely aligned with the fundamentals. Extending the post-Lehman period with two more
2Since credit spreads reect not only default and recovery assessments but also market liquidity conditions
and the investors' ability to diversify credit risk among other factors, changes in credit spread forecasts do
not necessarily translate one-for-one into changes in expectations about default and recovery rates. For
further discussion, see e.g. Hartelius et al. (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011) for sovereign emerging market
debt and Amato and Remolona (2003) and Huang and Huang (2012) for corporate debt in mature markets.
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years, we nd weaker predictive ability for all models entertained, particularly, for the long-
term bonds. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that bond prices gradually begin
to show divergence from the fundamentals as the Lehman Brothers collapse fades away in
investors memory. This result conrms the temporary nature of wake-up call eects in nan-
cial markets; namely, as time passes and market stability is regained after a distress event,
investors' attention to fundamentals begins to subside, reverting to the pre-event state.
Related Literature. There are only two emerging market debt studies that are concerned
with OOS predictability, to our best knowledge. Sueppel (2005) predicts the cointegration
path of the spread on the Merril Lynch Emerging Market Bond index. Hilscher and Nosbusch
(2010) construct a hazard model for forecasting the sovereign's default probability using the
J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global index;3 they use the default probability
forecasts as inputs to construct hazard-model-implied spreads. Our paper distinguishes
itself from these two studies in various aspects. First, the target variables dier. We seek
to predict an observable variable, the sovereign credit spread, at a quarter-ahead horizon
whereas Sueppel (2005) targets the long-run equilibrium path of the spread which is latent.
Unlike Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) who target the default component of the spread, we
predict the entire spread that comprises a default-risk related component and a non-default
related risk premium; the latter is sizeable and non-negligible (see, e.g., Longsta et al.,
2011). Second, our predictability analysis is based on disaggregated data for bonds of short
and long maturities instead of relying on an index (pooling bonds of dierent maturities)
as proxy for a country's debt portfolio. Finally, these two OOS predictive studies are not
concerned with the term structure; namely, their candidate set of predictors includes neither
3Focusing on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index as debt portfolio, Comelli (2012) estimates
a model of emerging-market sovereign credit spreads based on credit risk ratings and global factors such as
the VIX volatility index, and U.S. interest rates, but they do not assess the OOS predictability of spreads.
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the current sovereign credit spread curve nor the global riskless yield curve.
A vast empirical literature on riskless debt documents that level, slope and curvature of
the yield curve contain useful information about future yields (see e.g., Fama and Bliss, 1987,
Campbell and Shiller, 1991, and Diebold and Li, 2006). However, more recent studies provide
evidence suggesting that the yield curve may not be completely capturing all the relevant
information for predicting future yields; see e.g., Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Moench (2008),
and Ludvigson and Ng (2009) for studies of riskless yields and Krishnan et al. (2010) and
Thomson et al. (2006) for studies of corporate credit spreads in advanced economies. Our
study revisits the latter question, encapsulated in Hypothesis 1, in the context of emerging
sovereign credit spreads and from the novel perspective of OOS predictability tests.
The present study is related to empirical papers that assess the determinants of emerging-
market sovereign credit spreads. The established wisdom is that both global factors (e.g.,
Uribe and Yue, 2006; Hartelius et al., 2008; Longsta et al., 2011) and domestic macroeco-
nomic indicators (e.g., Min, 1998; Ferrucci, 2003; Baldacci et al., 2008) matter. However,
good in-sample model t and signicance of explanatory variables from standard tests does
not necessarily translate into predictive ability in real time.
Finally, our paper is in agreement with a literature that has adduced evidence of wake-up
calls in sovereign debt markets. In the context of Eurozone countries, Caceres et al. (2010),
Mink and Haan (2013) and Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) show that, in sharp contrast with
the pre-crisis period, markets changed the pricing model to one driven by macroeconomic
fundamentals and international risk in the aftermath of the crisis. Our paper distinguishes
itself from these studies in that it sheds light on the notion of wake-up calls from the novel
lens of OOS predictability tests and in the context of emerging debt markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the predictive models while Section 3
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describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
2.1 Emerging market zero-coupon credit spreads
The time t price of a zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at t+  obeys the relation
pi;t () = e
 yi;t() (1)
where i denotes the sovereign bond issuer, and yi;t () is the yield to maturity  . The target
variable in our predictability analysis is the emerging market zero-coupon bond yield spread
si;t ()  yi;t ()  yf;t () (2)
where yf;t() is the time t yield on a U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond. We extract at the
weekly frequency the unsmoothed yields on zero-coupon riskless bonds by applying the Fama
and Bliss (1987) methodology to cross-sections of market prices of U.S. Treasuries.4 The un-
smoothed Fama-Bliss yields price U.S. Treasuries exactly (see Diebold and Li, 2006). Next
we t the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson decomposition to those unsmoothed Fama-Bliss yields by
Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) to obtain the smoothed yields on zero-coupon riskless bonds
which are denoted yf;t () in (2). The Nelson-Siegel-Svensson equation enables superior risk-
less bond yield estimation accuracy relative to simpler representations (see Svensson, 1994).
With these zero-coupon riskless bond yields in hand, we can construct the corresponding
emerging-market credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds, denoted si;t (), as follows.
4We thank Robert Bliss for sharing his software and data les.
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We adopt the parsimonious Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition for the spread on
the (zero-coupon) maturity  bond of the emerging-market sovereign i
si;t () = i0;t + i1;t

1  e i;t
i;t

+ i2;t

1  e i;t
i;t
  e i;t

(3)
where t = 1; 2; :::; T are sample weeks, and the vector (i0;t, i1;t, i2;t)
0
collects the level, slope
and curvature factors, respectively. We extract these latent factors by NLS minimization
of the distance between the cross-section of observed coupon-paying emerging market bond
prices and the corresponding tted bond prices from Eqs. (1)-(3) with exponential decay
parameter xed at i;t = 0:7308 (annualized yields), as in Diebold and Li (2006). Then
with the weekly spread factors in hand, ^i0;t; ^i1;t; ^i2;t; t = 1; :::; T , we can construct weekly
zero-coupon emerging market bond spreads for any maturity, si;t(), using Eq. (3).
2.2 Hierarchical predictive regressions
Following Diebold and Li (2006) and Krishnan et al. (2010) in the riskless debt and risky
corporate debt contexts, respectively, we construct baseline forecasts for the h-week-ahead
spread as forward projections of the current spread curve using the predictive equation
si;t+h () = i + i0^i0;t + i1^i1;t + i2^i2;t + "i;t+h; t = 1; 2; ::; T: (4)
The parameters i and ij; j = 0; 1; 2; are estimated by OLS using the weekly time-series of
emerging market spreads and spread curve factors.5 In a hierarchical regression approach,
5Diebold and Li (2006) employ instead a two-step forecasting method by, rst, tting autoregressive
models (by OLS) to the estimated weekly factors to capture persistence, and then using the corresponding
projections, ^ij;t+h = f(^ij;t), j = 0; 1; 2 as predictive variables in Eq. (4).
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we gradually add global macroeconomic factors, Gt, and formulate the predictive model
si;t+h () = i + i0^i0;t + i1^i0;t + i2^i2;t + 
G
i Gt + "i;t+h (5)
and emerging-market specic macroeconomic factors, EMi;t, leading to the predictive model
si;t+h () = i + i0^i0;t + i1^i0;t + i2^i2;t + 
G
i Gt + 
EM
i EMi;t + "i;t+h; (6)
The predictive horizon is one-quarter-ahead (h = 13 weeks). We discuss the candidates for
global predictors, Gt, and domestic predictors, EMi;t, in the next section.
For the OOS predictability analysis, we split the T weekly data points available per
period into an estimation window (T0 = 2=3T weeks) and a holdout or evaluation window
(T1 = 1=3T weeks). The predictions are obtained recursively. The rst estimation window
spans week t = 1 up to week t = T0 and enables a rst h-week-ahead prediction s^i;t+hjt ().
The window spanning weeks t = 1 to t = T0 + 1 enables a second prediction and so forth.
2.3 Evaluation of predictive ability
We utilize the mean square error (MSE) statistic, which captures the expected value of the
squared error loss or quadratic loss, to measure the quality of the quarter-ahead OOS fore-
casts s^i;t(). Signicance is assessed through the Clark and West (2007) one-sided MSE-
adjusted t-test. The relevant question in our hierarchical modeling approach is: Does
model B produce superior OOS forecasts than a simpler (nested) model A. Under H0,
model A is assumed to generate the data and therefore model B requires estimating un-
necessary parameters which introduces noise in the MSEB. Hence, the expected value of
the dierential MSEA  MSEB is negative under H0; the adjustment of the Clark-West
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test statistic is meant to account for this noise and the test hypotheses are formulated as
H0 : MSEA MSEB against HA : MSEA > MSEB. Thus, a test rejection indicates that
the augmented model B produces more accurate OOS forecasts than the nested model A.
A second set of OOS predictability tests is aimed at benchmarking. The idea is to assess
whether our predictive regressions, Eqs. (4)-(6), are able to beat those models employed as
benchmarks in the literature. Given the stylized persistence of credit spreads, a widely-used
benchmark is the random walk (RW) model sRWi;t+hjt () = si;t ()+"i;t+h. Another benchmark
in the literature is a time-series OLS regression of the future credit spread change on the
current credit spread slope, si;t+h ()  si;t() = ci + di(si;t()  si;t(2)) + "i;t+h, where si;t(2)
denotes the 2-year credit spread; see, for instance, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Diebold
and Li (2006). Since the benchmarking involves comparing non-nested models, we employ the
Diebold and Mariano (1995) two-sided t-test which hypothesizes H0 : MSEb  MSEj = 0
against HA : MSEb   MSEj 6= 0, with the subscripts j and b denoting the candidate
predictive model and the benchmark at hand, respectively. Both sets of OOS predictive
ability tests are adjusted for autocorrelation in the weekly OOS forecast error sequence.
3 Credit Spreads and Predictors: Data Description
3.1 Bond market price data and preliminary analysis
At the rst stage, the modeling and forecasting exercise is carried out separately over two
periods of approximately 5-year length surrounding the Lehman Brothers' default. The
rst period is July 1, 2003 to September 14, 2008 (pre-Lehman; 268 weeks). Excluding
the anomalous weeks immediately following the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, the second
period is December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 (post-Lehman; 263 weeks). At the second
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stage, we extend the post-Lehman period by two years to December 31, 2015. The data used
for the riskless zero-coupon bond yield extraction and corresponding term-structure curve
tting are midweek bid-ask average price quotes for U.S. Treasury bonds obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices. Over 100 prices are available per week.
We establish various bond eligibility criteria towards achieving reliable term structure
estimation. The rst requirement is the availability on each weekly observation point of
market prices for at least six Eurobond issues across a range of maturities (from 1 to 32
years). The minimum amount at issue is $500 million to mitigate illiquidity. Since very few
emerging-market Eurobonds with maturity below 3 years or above 20 years are available on
a trading day, we focus the analysis on 3- to 20-year maturities. The pool of eligible bonds
per country is further ltered to retain only plain-vanilla bond issues, with xed regular
coupon payments and without collateral, sink funds or other special contractual aspects.6
The primary data source is Bloomberg but we use Datastream as supplementary source
to fulll our requirement of at least 6 market bond prices observed on any given week (14% of
our bond price series are from Datastream). The week-by-week spread curve tting is nally
based on cross-sections of between 9 and 19 (6 and 17) midweek bid-ask average prices for
U.S. dollar denominated Eurobonds issued by Brazil, Mexico and Turkey (the Philippines).
The empirical distribution of the bond pricing error (i.e., observed minus tted price)
for a $100 bond has a mean value of less than 2 cents for U.S. Treasuries and between 1
and 8 cents for emerging market bonds on average across maturities and sample weeks. The
dispersion of the pricing errors, given by the standard deviation, is 27 cents for the U.S.
market, and between 76 and 112 cents for emerging markets. These statistics for the bond
pricing errors compare well with those reported in similar studies of speculative and low
6Using data on sovereign CDS spread contracts is problematic in the present emerging-market context
because of illiquidity at both short and long maturities. Ammer and Cai (2007) show that for many emerging
sovereigns the price discovery occurs in the bond market which they ascribe to the lesser CDS market liquidity.
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investment-grade bonds such as Elton et al. (2001) and Krishnan et al. (2010).
Figure 1 shows the weekly emerging-market spread curves for 3- to 20-year maturity
bonds. To preserve space, hereafter the discussion is conned to a short (5-year) maturity
and a long (15-year) maturity.7 Various stylized facts are conrmed by the summary statistics
for the weekly credit spreads and spread curve factors shown in Table 1.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 around here]
First, the credit spread curves exhibit time heterogeneity. The common time-variation
reects the global business cycle. For instance, all four spread curves decline during the 2003-
2006 period of favorable global nancial conditions and ample liquidity. This is followed by a
moderate rise in spreads during the turbulent 2007-2008 period. In September 2008 (Lehman
Brothers' bankruptcy), the curves shift upwards sharply. Moreover, the curves are mainly
upward-sloping but the slope somewhat lessens post-Lehman reecting the start of a global
recovery. Consistent with a slow improvement in global fundamentals and relatively stable
country-specic economic conditions, the time variation in the credit curve level ^0;t and
slope ^1;t, captured by their standard deviation also lessens post-Lehman (Table 1). The
rst-order autocorrelation coecient of the credit spread conrms its stylized persistence.8
Second, there is also heterogeneity across the four sovereign credit spread curves which
reects dierences in the fundamentals underlying their debt repayment ability. This is espe-
cially evident at the beginning of the sample period in line with the dierent ratings assigned
by the S&P's agency: low speculative grade B for Brazil and Turkey, higher speculative grade
BB for the Philippines, and investment grade BBB for Mexico.
While all four economies beneted from favorable global economic conditions reected in
7We also analyzed the predictability of emerging market sovereign spreads for 3-, 10-, and 20-year maturity
bonds. The ndings are broadly similar to those discussed in the paper; details are available upon request.
8Credit spreads are theoretically conceptualized as realizations from persistent but stationary processes.
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a considerable downward shift in credit spread curves in the mid 2000s, increased dierences
in their debt repayment ability are revealed post-Lehman through substantial cross-section
heterogeneity of credit spread curves. In particular, relatively small uctuations in the credit
spread curves of Mexico and the Philippines are aligned with a stable investment grade BBB
rating for Mexico and an upgrade from speculative grade BB to investment grade BBB
rating on May 2, 2013 for the Philippines. Both countries remain investment grade rated
with stable or positive rating outlooks until the end of the sample period.
The credit spread curves of Brazil and Turkey uctuate more. The S&P's agency up-
graded the rating for Turkey to BB on August 17, 2004 but between April 3, 2008 and
February 7, 2014 it issued a series of negative rating outlooks that signaled a heightened
downgrade risk; the credit spread curve of Turkey exhibits several jumps during this pe-
riod. Brazil's rating improved notably pre-Lehman from a low speculative grade B to BB on
September 17, 2004 and to investment grade BBB on April 30, 2008. However, this trend
reversed on June 6, 2013 when S&P's issued the rst of various consecutive negative rating
outlooks for Brazil that ended up in a downgrade to speculative grade BB on September 9,
2015; accordingly, the credit spread curves of Brazil shift upwards during this period.
3.2 Global macroeconomic predictors
Our hierarchical regression approach starts by constructing OOS quarter-ahead spread pre-
dictions from the baseline credit spread curve model, Eq. (4). Next, we expand the model
with various macroeconomic variables and assess the OOS predictability gains.
Among the global macroeconomic variables, the rst natural candidates are the level,
slope, and curvature factors (f0;t,f1;t, f2;t)
0
that jointly summarize the information con-
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tent of the global riskless yield curve.9 The motivation is twofold. First, through its impact
on domestic business conditions, the global interest rate inuences the emerging economy's
future ability to repay external debt. The current global riskless yield curve is thus likely to
convey information about the future default-risk related component of the emerging market
sovereign spread.10 Empirically, it has been shown that U.S. interest rate shocks are respon-
sible for about 20% of uctuations in an emerging economy's aggregate activity, and the
transmission mechanism occurs mainly through the country's credit spread that determines
the borrowing cost that the country faces in international markets (Uribe and Yue, 2006).
Second, the global interest rate inuences global liquidity conditions and investors' risk
appetite which, in turn, aect the demand for emerging-market sovereign bonds and there-
fore, the (non-default) emerging-market risk premium component of the spread (Longsta
et al., 2011). In other words, the U.S. Treasury bond yield reects the Fed's monetary pol-
icy path which inuences the capital re-allocation among asset classes globally and the net
capital ows to emerging markets. For instance, an expansionary U.S. monetary policy to-
gether with a decrease in investors' risk aversion can fuel the search for yield which leads to
surges in the global demand for emerging market bonds and lower spreads; tighter monetary
conditions in major economies and a drying up of global liquidity can reverse the capital
ows and increase the spreads (Hartelius et al., 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009).
Our next candidate predictor is the U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, denoted shortf;t
and measured at the weekly frequency (on each week t = 1; 2:::; T of the sample period) as
the standard deviation of the weekly 1-year U.S. Treasury bond yield over the most recent
9Following Diebold and Li (2006), we t the Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition to the unsmoothed
Fama-Bliss yields on zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds to obtain the three latent factors.
10In the neoclassical growth model of Uribe and Yue (2006), a positive U.S. interest rate shock contracts
the emerging economy's output and investment. The small open economy model of Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) contends that shocks to the U.S. interest rate inuence emerging-market business conditions. The
structural sovereign debt model of Gibson and Sundaresan (2005) predicts a counter-cyclical relationship
between the global business cycle, which is signaled by the global interest rate, and the credit spread.
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10-week window. Greater uncertainty about the monetary policy of major economies (global
business conditions) as signaled by higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, poses a chal-
lenge for international investors regarding nancial risk allocation decisions (e.g., Hartelius
et al., 2008; Arora and Cerisola, 2001). Higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility also im-
plies greater uncertainty about global liquidity which is likely to widen the emerging market
spread. Figure A1 (Panel I) in the on-line Addendum visually illustrates this point through
time-series graphs of the weekly 5-year credit spreads, si;t(5), i={Mexico, Turkey}, alongside
the 13-week-lagged U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, shortf;t 13. The post-Lehman sample
correlation coecient between the two variables is large and positive ranging across the four
countries between 0.60 and 0.80 (0.62 and 0.79) for the 5- (15-) year credit spreads.11
The global macroeconomic variables are added to the baseline model in a two-step hi-
erarchical fashion leading to the re-specication of Eq. (5) as model G1 with the global
predictors Gt  (f0;t; f1;t; f2;t)
0
, and model G2 with Gt 
 
f0;t; f1;t; f2;t;
short
f;t
0
. The
sample distribution of the global macroeconomic variables is summarized in Table 1.
3.3 Domestic macroeconomic predictors
Extant business cycle theory and evidence suggest that an emerging-market sovereign's ex-
ternal sector conveys information about its economic conditions which, in turn, drives future
credit spreads. The sovereign's trade balance signals its ability to generate funds in hard
currencies for servicing external debt and the volatility of trade balance signals uncertainty
thereof. The small-open-economy model of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) decomposes the real
interest rate into two components, international rate and country risk, and suggests that
net exports are more strongly counter-cyclical in emerging markets than in developed ones.
11The counterpart correlations pre-Lehman are much lower ranging across countries between -0.32 and
-0.13 (-0.22 and -0.05) for the 5- (15-) year bonds.
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A greater trade balance in emerging economies has been shown to be linked with output,
consumption and investment contraction (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Neumeyer and Perri,
2005). In the real business cycle model for an emerging economy of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007), trend shocks to productivity growth are the key driver of economic growth, and
the volatility of trade balance signals the relative weight of trend versus temporary shocks.
This aligns well with the nding that trend shocks to productivity growth can quantitatively
match the frequency of defaults in emerging economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006).
Thus motivated, we assess the OOS predictive ability of the trade balance (TBi;t) dened
as the month t exports minus imports over GDP in US$, and the volatility of trade balance
(TBi;t ) given by the standard deviation of TBi;t over the most recent 6-month window. The
data are from Datastream and weekly TBi;t and 
TB
i;t are obtained by interpolation. The link
between credit spreads, si;t(), and lagged trade balance volatility, 
TB
i;t 13, can be informally
gleaned from the time-series plots in Figure A1 (Panel II) of the on-line Addendum.
It is also known that terms-of-trade shocks aect economic activity mainly through uc-
tuations in the price of energy and other commodities. In the context of emerging economies,
the eect is amplied by specialization in commodity exports, dependence on imported cap-
ital goods, and limited access to global nancial markets (Chen and Rogo, 2003; Mendoza,
1995; IMF, 1991). Previous research has linked current terms-of trade-growth and future
sovereign default risk (Bulow and Rogo, 1989; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010).
The savings-under-uncertainty neoclassical model of Mendoza (1997) predicts a positive
link between terms-of-trade changes and economic growth, and implies also that high terms-
of-trade growth variability can impair economic growth and reduce social welfare. Extant
evidence suggests that not only the terms-of-trade growth but also its volatility are signicant
determinants of future emerging market sovereign default risk (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010).
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These considerations motivate us to examine the forecasting ability of terms-of-trade growth
(TTi;t) and volatility of terms-of-trade growth (
TT
i;t ). TTi;t is measured on each sample
month t as the annual percentage change in the US$ price of the country's exports relative to
the US$ price of its imports; TTi;t is the standard deviation of TTi;t over the most recent
6-month window. The data are from Datastream and we also conduct weekly interpolation.
For completeness, we entertain also as predictor the emerging-market nancial risk rating
(referred to as country rating, CR, for simplicity hereafter) provided by the International
Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services Group. The CR captures sovereign risks
related to the deterioration in various foreign debt related indicators  foreign debt to GDP,
foreign debt service to exports, current account to exports, ocial reserves and exchange rate
stability  which have been shown to be contemporaneously linked to the credit spread; see
Min (1998) and Eichengreen and Mody (1998) inter alia. Hence, the CR complements the
aforesaid external sector variables by signalling the more imminent ability of debt repayment.
The numerical scale of the CR and, importantly, its regular monthly updating makes
it more attractive as candidate predictor than the letter-based credit ratings of the Fitch,
Moody's and S&P's agencies that signal broadly similar information but suer from stale-
ness.12 The CR is employed as country credit risk proxy in IMF research; see, e.g., Lueng-
naruemitchai and Schadler (2007), Comelli (2012) and Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013). Figure
2 plots the CR and the Credit Rating-Outlook Index (CROI) which is a transformation of the
S&P's credit rating into a numerical scale using the Hartelius et al. (2008) method.13 Figure
2 shows that CRs and CROIs co-move strongly but negatively since a higher CR (CROI)
signals better (worse) creditworthiness. More importantly, the CROI tends to lag the CR
12The construction of the CR measure (in a 050 scale) is explained in Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013) and
http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg.
13Hartelius et al. (2008) propose a non-linear transformation of the S&P's letter-based credit ratings, with
rating modiers and outlooks, into a 0-50 scale (the CROI) using calibration to bond pricing data.
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by roughly four months; the sample correlation between CR and the 4-month lagged CROI
is -0.68, -0.53, -0.82, and -0.54 for Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey, respectively.
Through a monthly panel regression analysis, Comelli (2012) nds evidence of a signif-
icant relation between the credit spread and the one-month lagged CR which leaves some
predictive scope for the latter. On the other hand, the literature predominantly nds a
contemporaneous monthly relationship between agency's credit ratings and credit spreads
(e.g., Hartelius et al., 2008, Jaramillo and Tejada, 2011, and Bussière and Ristiniemi, 2012)
which suggests an even shorter-term ability, if any, of the agency's credit ratings to pre-
dict the credit spread. However, event-study analyses of the daily spread dynamics do not
bear out this predictive scope as they reveal a largely anticipatory response of the spread;
namely, most of the action in the credit spread occurs prior to the actual rating event (e.g.,
González-Rozada and Yeyati, 2008, and Bussière and Ristiniemi, 2012).14 Altogether, this
evidence supports our choice of the CR as a candidate predictor over the agency's credit
rating, particularly, given the forecasting horizon (3 months) of interest in the paper.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We built our predictive models in a hierarchical fashion as follows. Adding the CR
variable to the model at hand, G2, we obtain the model called GEM1. Next we add the
trade balance to obtain GEM2, and the volatility of trade balance to obtain GEM3. Finally,
model GEM4 includes also terms-of-trade growth, and GEM5 adds the volatility of terms-of-
trade growth. Summary statistics for the country-specic external sector variables and CR
are provided in Table 1. The full list of specications is shown in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
14A parallel literature utilizes binary response models to assess the ability of the agency's credit ratings to
anticipate nancial distress events (e.g., debt crises). The predictive information content of ratings, if any,
is very low versus that of fundamentals (see e.g., Reinhart, 2002 and Bussière and Ristiniemi, 2012).
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Predictive ability in 5-year pre- and post-Lehman periods
The baseline credit spread factor model and the two extensions with global variables, models
G1 and G2, are compared in Table 3. Using expanding estimation windows, we construct
92 quarter-ahead OOS spread forecasts in the 5-year pre-Lehman period; the rst forecast
(based on a window of 163 weeks) is for November 28, 2006 and the last one for September
9, 2008. In the 5-year post-Lehman period, the number of OOS forecasts is 90; the rst
forecast (160-week window) is for March 27, 2012 and the last one for December 31, 2013.
Global macroeconomic variables. The information content in the global riskless yield
curve enhances the OOS predictive ability as borne out by the small root mean square error
ratio of model G1 relative to the baseline model (i.e., RMSEG1=RMSEbase < 1) reported in
Table 3. This nding represents evidence against Hypothesis 1 that the credit spread curve is
a sucient statistic to predict the future spread. On average across countries, the reduction
in forecast errors aorded by the global riskless yield curve (1   RMSEG1=RMSEbase) is
-0.1% and 2.6% pre-Lehman and a remarkably larger 12.0% and 11.5% post-Lehman for
the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. The one exception is Brazil pre-Lehman where
augmenting the model with the riskless yield curve factors adds noise to the predictions
(RMSEG1=RMSEbase > 1). Towards explaining this contrasting nding for Brazil, we notice
a distinct sharp fall in its credit spreads pre-Lehman. Helped by favorable global market
conditions and investors' search for yield, the dramatic improvement in Brazil's credit rating
from B in 2003 to BBB in 2008 may have induced over-condent sentiment towards Brazil
that decoupled its spreads from the levels consistent with the global interest rate.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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Further adding the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate shrinks the forecast
errors (1   RMSEG2=RMSEG1 > 0) on average across countries by 0.4% and 3.5% pre-
Lehman and by 6.6% and 5.5% post-Lehman for the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. The
Clark and West (2007; CW) tests unambiguously conrm that this global macroeconomic
uncertainty indicator adds signicant predictive content post-Lehman to the credit-spread
curve and riskless yield curve across the bond maturity spectrum. This evidence supports
Hypothesis 2 on the wake-upeect of the Lehman Brothers' collapse.
Next we benchmark the baseline predictive model and its extensions with global macroe-
conomic indicators (models G1 and G2) against the random walk and slope-regression. The
results are set up in Table 4. Reported RMSE ratios below unity indicate that the candidate
model gives more accurate forecasts than the benchmark. A signicant and positive Diebold-
Mariano t-test statistic indicates that the candidate model outperforms the benchmark.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
The baseline model, Eq. (4), almost never beats both benchmarks, neither pre-Lehman
nor post-Lehman; exceptions are the 5-year bonds of the Philippines and 5 and 15-year bonds
of Turkey post-Lehman when both benchmarks are outperformed by the credit curve model
at the 5% signicance level. Exploiting the global riskless yield curve reduces the model
G1 forecast errors enough for it to outperform both benchmarks post-Lehman, with some
exceptions (Brazil 5 and 15-year bonds, and Mexico 15-year bonds). It is only when the
U.S. short-term interest rate volatility is added as predictor that, for all countries and bond
maturities, the resulting model G2 beats both benchmarks post-Lehman. In sharp contrast,
pre-Lehman models G1 andG2 generally fail to outperform both benchmarks. These ndings
altogether represent further evidence against Hypothesis 1 about the informativeness of the
credit spread curve alone, but provide support for the wake-up call Hypothesis 2.
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As a robustness check, we reformulated the predictive regressions substituting the rst
three Principal Components (PCs) of the credit spreads and the U.S. Treasury yields, re-
spectively, for the level, slope and curvature of the country credit spread curve and the global
riskless yield curve.15 The resulting RMSE ratios and signicance statistics do not challenge
the above ndings, and are not reported to preserve space (available upon request).
Domestic macroeconomic variables. Next we assess the predictive content of the CR
and external sector variables through our hierarchical regression approach by confronting
models GEM1 and G2, models GEM2 and GEM1, and so on. Table 5 reports the results.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
At both the short- and long-end of the bond maturity spectrum, the country-specic
external sector indicators aord signicant predictive gains, especially post-Lehman. Most
prominently, the information content in the volatility of the trade balance signicantly im-
proves the OOS forecasts for short- and long-term maturity bond spreads, particularly post-
Lehman; the only exception is the Philippines. On average across Brazil, Mexico and Turkey,
a post-Lehman forecast error reduction (1   RMSEGEM3=RMSEGEM2 > 0) of 8.5% and
11.6% is achieved for the 5- and 15-year credit spreads, respectively. Again post-Lehman
only, the information content in the volatility of terms-of-trade growth improves the accuracy
of forecasts (1   RMSEGEM5=RMSEGEM4 > 0) for the Brazil short- and long-term bond
spreads and the Mexico short-term bond spreads. These distinctive results for Brazil and
Mexico are plausible given that both countries are highly reliant on commodity exports.
The absence of evidence on the predictive role of external trade volatility indicators for
the Philippines is not surprising. To begin with, data on its terms-of-trade data is unavailable
15At weekly frequency, we extract the PCs of credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds of 3, 4,..., 20 year
maturity and yields on U.S. zero-coupon bonds of 1, 2,..., 20 year maturity.
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for most of the sample period which precludes the study of the predictive models GEM4
and GEM5. The Eurobond market for the Philippines is notably smaller than that of
Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, reecting the much smaller size of this economy.16;17 Smaller
bond market size is generally associated with higher market frictions such as the cost of
trading due to lower trading volumes and lesser liquidity, and also with higher information
costs. These sovereign bond market frictions may hinder predictability by obscuring the
nexus between the credit spread and past country-specic macroeconomic fundamentals.
The trade balance and terms-of-trade growth exhibit also less predictive ability pre- than
post-Lehman, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, their overall predictive ability is less
remarkable than that of the volatility of the trade balance and terms-of-trade growth. The
forecast error change aorded by the trade balance level (1   RMSEGEM2=RMSEGEM1)
is either positive but statistically insignicant or negative. The information in the level of
terms-of-trade growth helps to reduce the forecast error (1 RMSEGEM4=RMSEGEM3 > 0)
for Brazil and Turkey at about 5.1% altogether but only regarding the 15-year bonds.
The domestic CR predictor stands in contrast with the external sector variables due to its
weaker OOS predictive power post-Lehman. The error reduction (1 RMSEGEM1=RMSEG2)
is 5.0% and 6.0% pre-Lehman versus -3.7% and -0.1% post-Lehman on average across coun-
tries for the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. Our rationale for this nding is that the
signicant predictive content of the CR for credit spreads pre-Lehman indicates that the
information it conveys about imminent sovereign debt paying ability is then less quickly
16Many sovereign emerging Eurobond markets, including new or historically small markets, expanded
considerably during 2003-2013. For instance, external nancing of new bond issuance measured by the
four-year total (in billions US$) trebled or even became four times larger from $40.7, $30.3, and $19.2 in
2000-2003 to $168.9, $119.2, and $53.5 in 2010-2013 for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively (IMF, 2004,
and IMF, 2014). In contrast, the Philippines' new issuance expanded moderately from $12.9 to $18.0 billion.
17For instance, in the 4th quarter of 2013 the size of the Philippines economy by GDP was more than
3-fold smaller than that of Turkey, and 8-fold smaller than Brazil. The respective gures are 2.5, 1.3, 1.0
and 0.3 trillion US$ for Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and the Philippines (Source: Datastream).
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impounded into bond prices. The quarter-ahead predictive content of the CR vanishes post-
Lehman, reecting a dramatic change in the emerging-market bond price discovery process
which becomes then more ecient; this evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Finally, we benchmark the OOS predictions. The results are reported in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
During the pre-Lehman period, the augmented models with external sector variables and
the CR generally fail to outperform the two benchmarks. In sharp contrast, post-Lehman the
same models beat the benchmarks for all countries and bond maturities. Overall the ndings
indicate that credit spreads became more closely aligned with fundamentals post-Lehman.
4.2 Predictive ability in the extended post-Lehman period
As the crisis event begins to fade away in investors' memory and the markets regain stability,
the incentive to acquire costly country-specic fundamental information begins to wane. To
test this transitory wake-up call eects notion, we repeat the predictability analysis in an
extended post-Lehman period that includes two further years  ending on December 31,
2015 (T = 367 weekly data points). Using the same expanding estimation window approach
and maintaining the same ratio of initial estimation window size (T1 = 2=3T ) and evaluation
window size (T2 = 1=3T ), the rst forecast is for July 30, 2013 and the last one for December
29, 2015. Table 7 illustrates the marginal predictive ability of global and domestic variables.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
The results in Panel A indicate that the global riskless yield curve no longer enhances
predictive ability as borne out by a large root mean square error ratio of model G1 relative
to the baseline model (i.e., RMSEG1=RMSEbase > 1), with the exception of the 5-year
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bonds for the Philippines. Nevertheless, the U.S. short-term interest rate volatility remains
an important predictor for all countries; the RMSE reduction (1 RMSEG2=RMSEG1) that
this global uncertainty indicator delivers is similar across the 5- and 15-year bond maturities
and similar to its earlier post-Lehman value. The analysis of domestic predictors in Panel B
suggests that the external trade variables remain important but their predictive content in
the 7-year post-Lehman period weakens relative to the 5-year post-Lehman period.
The benchmarking analysis summarized in Table 8 also reveals that the predictive ability
of both the baseline model and extensions with global and country-specic fundamentals
somewhat lessens in the extended post-Lehman period. Specically, neither the baseline
model nor extensions obtained by adding global/domestic predictors are generally able to
beat both benchmarks, a nding common across the 5- and 15-year maturity bonds. The
deterioration in the models' predictive ability is more pronounced for the long-term maturity
bonds. For instance, the RMSE reduction of the baseline model relative to the benchmarks
(1 RMSEBase=RMSEBench) declined on average across countries from 15% and 12% post-
Lehman to 12% and 5% in the extended post-Lehman period for the 5- and 15-year maturity
bonds, respectively. This is consistent with the notion of transitory wake-up call eects.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
We observe that the baseline and some augmented models for Brazil and Turkey (albeit
only for the 5-year bonds) outperform both benchmarks in the extended post-Lehman period.
These two countries have in common that they experienced a downward trend in their
creditworthiness in the extended post-Lehman period which may explain why investors'
incentives to monitor their fundamentals did not lessen in 2014 and 2015. In particular, the
rating assigned to Brazil by S&P's reversed its long-run upward trend on June 6, 2013 with
the issuance of a negative rating outlook leading to several subsequent negative rating changes
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pushing Brazil into the speculative grade rating category. Likewise, Turkey experienced
several negative rating outlooks between April 3, 2008 and February 7, 2014.
These ndings together with evidence of a weakened overall predictive ability of both
domestic sets of predictors, including the country credit spread and country-specic fun-
damentals, arm our overall conclusion that emerging bond market investors' attention to
fundamentals generally slipped during the extended post-Lehman period. The results also
indicate that the U.S. interest rate curve loses predictive ability in this period.18
As a robustness check, we reformulated the predictive regressions by dropping the U.S.
yield curve factors as they become uninformative in the extended post-Lehman period (see
Table 7), and repeated the benchmarking exercise. The resulting RMSE ratios and signi-
cance statistics reported in Table A2 of the on-line Addendum conrm our earlier ndings.
5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature that examines the behavior of emerging-market
sovereign credit spreads by providing a comprehensive out-of-sample predictability analysis.
The investigation is organized around two novel hypotheses in the context of emerging market
debt which have implications for policy-makers and bond investors. Hypothesis 1 states that
the current spread curve is a sucient statistic to predict future spreads. Building on the
notion of wake-up calls in nancial markets, Hypothesis 2 states that the spreads became
more closely aligned with fundamentals after the Lehman Brothers' collapse. In order to test
these hypotheses, we generate quarter-ahead predictions in pre- and post-Lehman periods
for four emerging-market sovereigns with relatively large and liquid bond markets (Brazil,
18The unprecedented long episode of extremely low U.S. interest rates that followed after the Lehman
Brothers' failure may explain why the U.S. yield curve factors become less informative for global investors in
the extended post-Lehman period. Therefore, without further specic tests to ascertain the latter we cannot
for sure attribute a weaker predictive ability of the U.S. yield curve factors to wake-up call eects.
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Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey) using a hierarchical regression approach.
The baseline model that exploits solely the information content in the current credit
spread curve is unable to outperform the canonical random walk and slope-regression bench-
marks. Adding global and country-specic macroeconomic variables reduces the prediction
errors. This evidence refutes Hypothesis 1 and aligns well with extant evidence for riskless
debt, questioning the assumptions of many ane term-structure models.
Measures of uncertainty about either the global economic outlook or the borrower's future
ability to repay debt convey useful information for future emerging-market credit spreads.
Volatility indicators therefore may serve as useful early-warning tools by policy-makers and
market participants. Overall we see also signicantly greater predictive ability of global and
country-specic macroeconomic indicators post-Lehman which, consistent with the wake-up
call Hypothesis 2, suggests that the pricing of emerging market bonds became then more
closely aligned with fundamentals. However, the evidence in this regard weakens over an
extended post-Lehman period which conrms that the wake-up call eects are transitory.
Our ndings endorse policies aimed at promoting emerging-market stability by restrain-
ing the volatility of U.S. monetary policy. They also promote policies aimed at sustaining
long-term growth in emerging economies by stabilizing their net exports and terms-of-trade
growth. Such long-term macroeconomic risk management via institutional and policy change
is promoted in Gray and Malone (2008). Our ndings also endorse the proposition made by
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), Caballero (2003) and Merton (2005) that sovereign borrow-
ers should consider innovative nancial instruments to hedge macroeconomic risk exposures.
Furthermore, since wake-up call eects ought to be temporary, which our evidence conrms,
in addition to modeling how investors learn in response to a nancial distress event it may
be of relevance to conceptualize how investors gradually forget it as markets regain stability.
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(a) Brazil       (b) Mexico 
   
(c) Philippines                           (d) Turkey 
 
FIG.1. Emerging Market Credit Spreads 
Each panel plots country credit spread curves estimated at the weekly frequency from July 1, 2003 to December 
31, 2015 with cross-sections of Eurobond prices using the Nelson-Siegel decomposition method.   
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       FIG.2. Country Risk and Credit Rating Outlook Index   
The monthly time-series plotted are the country Financial Risk Rating provided by the Political Risk Services Group (denoted country risk, CR) and the country Credit 
Rating Outlook Index obtained by mapping the letter-based S&P’s long-term foreign currency ratings with rating modifiers and outlooks (denoted rating) into numerical 
ratings using the approach proposed by Hartelius et al. (2008). An increase in the CR (decrease in rating) value indicates higher sovereign creditworthiness.  
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      TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CREDIT SPREADS AND PREDICTIVE VARIABLES 
         
The table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and 1st-order autocorrelation of 5- and 
15-year bond spreads, and candidate predictors. The betas are level, slope and curvature of the U.S. yield 
curve (US) and credit spread curve extracted from cross-sections of bond prices sampled at the weekly 
frequency. σf short is the standard deviation of the U.S. short-term interest rate over the most recent 10-
week period. CR is country risk. TB is trade balance. ∆TT is year-on-year terms of trade growth. σTB (σ∆TT) 
is the standard deviation of TB (∆TT) over the most recent 6-month period. The pre-Lehman period is 
July 1, 2003 to September 14, 2008 (268 weeks) and the post-Lehman period is December 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2013 (263 weeks).  
Variable
β f ,0 0.054 0.005 0.045 0.067 0.978 0.045 0.008 0.029 0.058 0.981
β f ,1 -0.014 0.019 -0.054 0.010 0.994 -0.027 0.015 -0.053 -0.004 0.981
β f ,2 -0.043 0.023 -0.096 -0.006 0.970 -0.091 0.017 -0.139 -0.048 0.942
σ f
short 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.965 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.933
ѕ(5) 0.028 0.018 0.006 0.080 0.978 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.050 0.939
ѕ(15) 0.036 0.020 0.010 0.096 0.980 0.019 0.007 0.010 0.045 0.938
β 0 0.040 0.022 0.012 0.103 0.980 0.021 0.006 0.012 0.041 0.930
β 1 -0.036 0.025 -0.103 0.017 0.968 -0.014 0.014 -0.041 0.023 0.843
β 2 -0.012 0.032 -0.078 0.090 0.929 -0.010 0.031 -0.107 0.069 0.903
CR 35.951 3.012 29.000 39.500 0.985 39.806 3.247 32.500 45.500 0.972
TB 0.333 0.116 0.055 0.560 0.990 0.079 0.062 -0.112 0.233 0.975
σ TB 0.051 0.017 0.024 0.106 0.980 0.043 0.015 0.021 0.090 0.980
∆ TT 2.393 2.825 -2.834 8.759 0.982 2.843 8.563 -8.752 19.361 0.997
σ ∆ TT 2.128 0.657 0.969 4.491 0.960 3.010 1.732 0.389 8.899 0.991
ѕ(5) 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.935 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.047 0.933
ѕ(15) 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.031 0.958 0.019 0.006 0.011 0.045 0.923
β 0 0.021 0.006 0.010 0.039 0.958 0.020 0.006 0.013 0.044 0.903
β 1 0.001 0.015 -0.039 0.040 0.848 -0.014 0.011 -0.044 0.008 0.790
β 2 -0.047 0.027 -0.114 0.022 0.852 -0.005 0.020 -0.062 0.063 0.795
CR 40.364 1.750 36.000 42.000 0.985 40.561 1.844 35.500 43.000 0.971
TB -0.076 0.057 -0.287 0.048 0.964 -0.023 0.061 -0.272 0.085 0.946
σ TB 0.044 0.023 0.010 0.102 0.979 0.052 0.022 0.024 0.131 0.980
∆ TT 3.583 3.487 -3.342 10.567 0.992 -0.233 10.178 -22.243 19.394 0.998
σ ∆ TT 2.065 0.748 0.909 4.080 0.985 4.212 3.280 1.018 14.099 0.993
ѕ(5) 0.026 0.010 0.008 0.045 0.981 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.067 0.947
ѕ(15) 0.035 0.014 0.014 0.058 0.991 0.021 0.008 0.010 0.051 0.947
β 0 0.041 0.017 0.015 0.068 0.991 0.022 0.007 0.010 0.042 0.936
β 1 -0.030 0.026 -0.068 0.064 0.867 -0.007 0.020 -0.042 0.080 0.912
β 2 -0.026 0.036 -0.147 0.058 0.854 -0.006 0.045 -0.151 0.159 0.927
CR 37.535 1.042 36.000 39.000 0.977 42.405 2.208 36.000 45.000 0.978
TB -0.366 0.191 -0.776 0.039 0.984 -0.275 0.169 -0.585 0.269 0.982
σ TB 0.156 0.061 0.041 0.324 0.985 0.135 0.052 0.077 0.328 0.985
ѕ(5) 0.026 0.012 0.011 0.075 0.948 0.026 0.011 0.013 0.073 0.930
ѕ(15) 0.032 0.010 0.020 0.078 0.950 0.028 0.010 0.014 0.062 0.949
β 0 0.035 0.010 0.023 0.079 0.954 0.029 0.009 0.013 0.063 0.952
β 1 -0.026 0.016 -0.079 0.006 0.915 -0.006 0.016 -0.055 0.061 0.747
β 2 -0.011 0.041 -0.113 0.118 0.945 -0.002 0.030 -0.124 0.127 0.757
CR 32.701 0.876 31.000 34.500 0.910 33.363 2.775 27.000 37.000 0.977
TB -0.774 0.108 -1.065 -0.446 0.978 -0.864 0.239 -1.253 -0.202 0.991
σ TB 0.074 0.030 0.024 0.149 0.985 0.099 0.037 0.042 0.209 0.984
∆ TT -0.485 3.357 -7.345 5.405 0.994 -0.460 4.102 -8.864 8.942 0.993
σ ∆ TT 1.869 0.658 0.795 3.391 0.987 2.026 1.247 0.626 5.320 0.992
AR(1)Country Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max AR(1)
Turkey
Panel A: Pre-Lehman Panel B: Post-Lehman
Brazil
Mexico
Philippines
US
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TABLE 2. HIERARCHICAL MODELS FOR EMERGING-MARKET SOVEREIGN CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION 
 
The target variable is the emerging-market sovereign credit spread on week t+h and the predictors are the variables in columns measured at week t. The 
predictive horizon h is 13 weeks (one quarter) ahead. The baseline model is a regression of the 5- and 15-year spread on spread curve factors, Eq. (4). Models 
G1 and G2 are extensions, Eq. (5), obtained by adding the U.S. yield curve factors and the volatility of the US short-term interest rate, respectively. Models 
GEM1 to GEM5 are extensions, Eq. (6), obtained by adding country risk, trade balance, volatility of trade balance, terms-of-trade growth, and volatility of 
terms of trade growth. The credit spread curve factors and U.S. yield curve factors are extracted using the Nelson-Siegel decomposition. The global and 
country-specific predictors are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the paper, respectively.  
  
Level Volatility Level Volatility
σ f
short CR TB σ TB ∆ TT σ ∆ TT
Baseline
G1 √
G2 √ √
GEM1 √ √ √
GEM2 √ √ √ √
GEM3 √ √ √ √ √
GEM4 √ √ √ √ √ √
GEM5 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Credit-spread-curve Volatility of U.S. 
short-term rate
U.S. yield curve factors  
(Level, Slope, Curvature)
Global  predictors Domestic predictors
Trade balance Terms-of-trade growthCountry risk 
rating
    β f,0      β f,1       β f,2
MODELS
√
√
√
β0      β1       β2
√
√
√
√
(Level, Slope, Curvature) 
√
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TABLE 3. PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The first row in each panel reports the RMSE of the baseline credit spread curve model. The following rows 
show the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand and the preceding (nested) model. Ratio RMSE < 1 indicates 
that the additional global macroeconomic predictors in the extended model bring a forecast error reduction 
vis-à-vis the preceding model. Significance of the mean error differential is tested with the Clark and West 
(2007; CW) t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the predictive ability of the extended model is not superior 
to that of the preceding model; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 for model G1 and 
𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 for model G2. ***, ** and * denotes rejection at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level, respectively. Table 2 lists all the models.  Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast 
horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is 
November 28, 2006 to September 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) in Panel A and March 27, 2012 to 
December, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman) in Panel B.  
.  
Model
Baseline RMSE 57.8 65.4 35.5 29.8 59.0 42.5 40.6 31.5
G1 Ratio RMSE 1.54 1.32 0.76 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.94
CW statistic 0.46 -0.04 2.48 *** 2.73 *** 3.59 *** 4.52 *** 3.26 *** 2.71 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.87 0.91 1.02 0.97 1.07 1.09 1.03 0.89
CW statistic 1.42 * 1.33 -0.45 1.24 -0.66 -0.29 2.73 *** 2.43 ***
Baseline RMSE 33.0 40.7 24.3 26.2 27.1 41.6 47.7 43.8
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.95 0.88 0.72 0.88 0.93
CW statistic 1.93 ** 2.36 *** 2.75 *** 2.28 ** 2.08 ** 2.98 *** 3.78 *** 3.39 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.84 0.95 0.91 0.92 1.01 0.96 0.97 0.96
CW statistic 3.23 *** 2.30 ** 2.90 *** 3.09 *** -0.98 2.58 *** 1.32 * 1.91 **
Panel A: Pre-Lehman 
Panel B: Post-Lehman 
Bond maturity
5-years 15-years
Bond maturity
5-years 15-years5-years 15-years5-years
Philippines Turkey
15-years
Bond maturity Bond maturity
Brazil Mexico
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TABLE 4. BENCHMARKING THE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The table reports the RMSE of the benchmark random walk (RW) and slope-regression (SR) models and the 
ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand to the benchmark. A ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the model brings a 
forecast error reduction versus the benchmark. Significance of the forecast accuracy gains is assessed with 
the Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean squared error; 
𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 = 0 vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level, respectively. Table 2 lists all the models.  Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast 
horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter-ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is 
November 28, 2006 to September 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) in Panel A, and March 27, 2012 to 
December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman) in Panel B. 
Model
Benchmark RMSE 49.5 50.3 47.0 50.9 39.6 38.0 31.6 30.9
Baseline Ratio RMSE 1.17 1.15 1.39 1.29 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.97
DM stat. -1.37 -1.96 -2.71 -2.86 2.77 *** 1.29 0.94 0.55
G1 Ratio RMSE 1.80 1.77 1.84 1.68 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.81
DM stat. -2.18 -2.37 -2.94 -3.17 2.80 *** 3.26 *** 1.89 * 2.49 **
G2 Ratio RMSE 1.56 1.54 1.67 1.54 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.79
DM stat. -1.97 -2.11 -3.07 -3.19 2.58 ** 3.03 *** 2.14 ** 2.54 **
Benchmark RMSE 60.9 59.0 39.0 38.6 46.3 48.9 33.1 33.5
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.97 1.00 1.09 1.10 0.88 0.83 0.95 0.94
DM stat. 0.90 0.03 -0.80 -1.00 1.15 1.24 0.43 0.44
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.75 0.71 0.89 0.88
DM stat. 1.99 ** 2.17 ** 1.33 1.37 2.09 ** 2.97 *** 0.92 0.97
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.77 0.73 0.79 0.78
DM stat. 0.99 0.86 0.43 0.37 2.02 ** 1.99 ** 1.95 * 1.90 *
Benchmark RMSE 34.6 36.7 43.9 47.0 26.3 26.9 29.0 32.0
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.95 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.82
DM stat. 0.50 0.61 0.86 1.56 1.17 1.08 1.00 2.00 **
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.91 0.85 0.88 0.82 0.75 0.74 0.86 0.78
DM stat. 0.79 1.17 1.28 2.40 ** 1.87 * 2.54 ** 1.09 3.44 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.67 0.79 0.72
DM stat. 2.46 ** 2.15 ** 2.21 ** 3.79 *** 2.46 ** 2.81 *** 1.89 * 3.68 ***
Benchmark RMSE 31.4 38.2 41.2 42.0 63.8 59.3 58.2 57.0
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.86 0.71 1.01 0.99 0.75 0.80 0.75 0.77
DM stat. 2.27 ** 2.48 ** -0.01 0.06 2.42 ** 2.22 ** 2.19 ** 2.43 **
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.62 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.71
DM stat. 2.08 ** 3.45 *** 2.11 ** 2.62 ** 2.59 ** 2.52 *** 2.19 ** 2.43 **
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.77 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.64 0.69 0.67 0.68
DM stat. 2.00 ** 3.41 *** 2.36 ** 2.97 *** 2.82 *** 2.78 *** 2.55 *** 2.84 ***
Brazil Mexico
Philippines Turkey
RW SR
Brazil Mexico
RW SR RW SR RW SR
Panel A: Pre-Lehman
Panel B: Post-Lehman
Philippines Turkey
5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread 15-year spread
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TABLE 5. PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF DOMESTIC MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The first row in each panel reports the RMSE of model G2 with predictors the spread curve factors and 
global variables (U.S. yield curve factors and U.S. short-term interest rate volatility). The subsequent rows 
report the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand and the preceding (nested) model. A ratio RMSE < 1 
indicates that the additional country-specific predictor in the model at hand reduces forecast errors versus 
the preceding model. Significance of the error reduction is assessed with the Clark and West (2007; CW) 
t-test for the null hypothesis that that the predictive ability of the extended model is not superior to that of 
the preceding nested model; e.g. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 for model GEM1 
and 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺2vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺2 for model GEM2. ***, ** and * denote 
rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. Table2 lists all the models. Models GEM4 and GEM5 
are precluded for Philippines due to data limitations for terms-of-trade. Estimation is based on weekly data. 
The forecast horizon is h=13 weeks. Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is 
November 28, 2006 to September 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) in Panel A, and March 27, 2012 to 
December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman) in Panel B. 
  
Model
G2 RMSE 77.4 78.6 27.6 24.4 53.8 37.0 35.5 26.1
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 0.82 0.87 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.91 0.99 1.03
CW statistic 2.59 *** 2.31 ** -0.18 2.20 ** 1.05 2.82 *** 1.22 -1.86
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.10
CW statistic -4.01 -2.64 -0.35 -0.49 0.98 -0.48 1.04 0.29
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.04 0.99 0.97 1.10 0.93
CW statistic 2.55 *** -0.43 -1.43 0.30 1.29 * 1.45 * -1.85 2.22 **
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.84 1.31
CW statistic 0.42 1.03 0.33 0.60 3.58 *** -1.65
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 1.07 1.04 0.98 1.00 1.06 1.00
CW statistic -0.77 -0.53 1.19 0.19 1.29 * 0.86
G2 RMSE 26.2 36.5 18.0 22.9 24.1 28.5 40.8 38.8
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 1.02 1.03 1.09 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.07 1.05
CW statistic -0.60 -1.51 -2.47 -0.10 2.31 ** 2.51 *** 1.83 ** 1.76 **
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.99 0.99 1.09 1.02 1.04 1.01 0.97 0.96
CW statistic 0.76 0.78 0.06 -1.19 0.13 0.08 1.15 1.12
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.81 0.86
CW statistic 1.62 * 2.13 ** 1.58 * 2.71 *** 0.88 -0.27 3.38 *** 2.45 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.03 0.95 1.01 1.04 0.99 0.94
CW statistic 0.40 2.07 ** -0.08 -1.23 1.16 1.91 **
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.96 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.02 1.01
CW statistic 1.41 * 2.68 *** 1.84 ** -1.40 -2.38 -1.38
Brazil
Bond maturity
Philippines TurkeyMexico
15-years
Bond maturity
Panel A: Pre-Lehman 
Panel B: Post-Lehman 
Bond maturity Bond maturity
5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years
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TABLE 6. BENCHMARKING THE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF DOMESTIC MACRO VARIABLES 
 
The table reports the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand versus the benchmark random walk (RW) and 
slope-regression (SR). Significance is assessed through the Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-test for the null 
hypothesis 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 = 0 vs. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denotes rejection 
at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. Table 2 lists all the models. Estimation is based on weekly data 
and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is τ = {5, 15} years. The forecast 
evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to September 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) in Panel A, 
and March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman) in Panel B. 
Model
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 1.28 1.26 1.46 1.35 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.75
DM stat. -1.40 -1.62 -3.35 -3.65 2.61 ** 3.03 *** 2.61 *** 2.75 ***
GEM2 RMSE Ratio 1.43 1.41 1.56 1.44 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.78
DM stat. -2.29 -2.76 -4.01 -4.32 2.35 ** 2.87 *** 2.27 ** 2.39 **
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 1.37 1.34 1.56 1.44 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.81
DM stat. -2.16 -2.69 -3.99 -4.33 2.01 ** 2.36 ** 2.02 ** 2.69 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.38 1.36 1.58 1.46 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.80
DM stat. -2.14 -2.56 -3.29 -3.48 2.10 ** 2.50 ** 2.02 ** 2.99 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 1.48 1.46 1.65 1.52 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.81 ***
DM stat. -2.61 -2.86 -3.62 -3.58 2.20 ** 2.57 ** 1.93 * 2.68
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.72 0.82 0.80
DM stat. 1.12 1.02 1.20 1.20 2.03 ** 2.03 ** 1.76 * 1.70 *
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.99 0.89 1.01 0.88 0.78 0.74 0.90 0.88
DM stat. 1.18 1.15 1.11 1.12 1.66 1.92 * 0.81 0.95
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.99 0.88 0.97 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.82
DM stat. 1.31 1.33 1.32 1.34 1.01 1.39 1.34 1.81 *
GEM4 0.72 0.68 1.09 1.08
1.96 * 2.14 ** -0.60 -0.76
GEM5 0.76 0.72 1.09 1.08
1.53 1.81 * -0.51 -0.50
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.77 0.73 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.72
DM stat. 2.56 ** 2.00 ** 2.10 ** 3.32 *** 2.32 ** 2.55 ** 1.87 * 3.73 ***
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.72 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.73
DM stat. 2.73 *** 1.97 * 2.38 ** 3.31 *** 1.45 1.77 * 1.73 * 3.46 ***
GEM3 RMSE Ratio 0.74 0.70 0.81 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.67 0.61
DM stat. 2.89 *** 2.04 ** 2.79 *** 3.24 *** 1.61 1.82 * 2.62 ** 3.35 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.79 0.77 0.70 0.64
DM stat. 2.30 ** 1.82 * 2.75 *** 3.23 *** 1.55 1.80 * 2.35 ** 3.26 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.64
DM stat. 2.52 ** 1.92 * 2.95 *** 3.44 *** 1.67 * 1.89 * 2.33 ** 3.24 ***
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.75 0.61 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.72
DM stat. 2.24 ** 3.64 *** 2.49 ** 3.11 *** 2.29 ** 2.56 ** 2.14 ** 2.82 ***
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 1.04 0.64 1.01 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.68 0.69
DM stat. 2.02 ** 3.77 *** 2.47 ** 3.18 *** 2.32 ** 2.26 ** 2.24 ** 2.60 **
GEM3 RMSE Ratio 0.99 0.63 1.00 0.67 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.60
DM stat. 2.43 ** 3.63 *** 2.48 ** 3.10 *** 2.79 *** 2.66 *** 2.58 ** 2.68 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.56
DM stat. 2.84 *** 2.68 *** 2.77 *** 2.79 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.57
DM stat. 2.79 *** 2.61 ** 2.75 *** 2.73 ***
Brazil
Philippines Turkey
Mexico
Panel B: Post-Lehman
RW SR RW SR RW SR
Panel A: Pre-Lehman
Brazil Mexico
Philippines Turkey
RW SR
5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread 15-year spread
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TABLE 7. PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: POST-LEHMAN EXTENDED 
 
The first row in panel A reports the RMSE of the baseline credit spread curve model. The following rows 
across both panels show the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand and the preceding (nested) model. A ratio 
RMSE < 1 indicates that the additional global macroeconomic predictors in the extended model bring a 
forecast error reduction vis-à-vis the preceding model. Significance of the mean error differential is tested 
with the Clark and West (2007; CW) t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the predictive ability of the 
extended model is not superior to that of the preceding model; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 = 0 vs. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 −
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 ≠ 0 for model G1;  𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 = 0 vs. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 ≠ 0 for model G2 and so on. 
***, ** and * denotes rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. Table 2 lists all the models.  
Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is 
𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is July 30, 2013 to December 31, 2015 (127 forecasts).  
Model
Baseline RMSE 57.2 63.2 20.1 28.1 22.4 23.2 42.4 43.8
G1 Ratio RMSE 1.01 1.04 1.08 1.05 0.98 1.12 1.36 1.26
CW statistic 0.80 -0.60 0.28 -0.27 3.02 *** 1.19 0.35 -0.53
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.94 0.97 0.99 0.95 1.01 0.95 0.86 0.85
CW statistic 1.94 ** 1.47 * 1.42 * 2.15 ** -2.10 2.59 *** 4.28 *** 4.85 ***
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 0.99 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.07 1.05
CW statistic 1.31 * 0.89 -1.11 0.78 0.11 0.57 -1.24 -0.72
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.96 0.98 1.02 0.97 1.09 1.04 0.85 0.88
CW statistic 1.38 * 1.24 -0.03 1.74 ** -0.64 -1.50 2.66 *** 2.63 ***
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.97 0.93 1.06 1.07 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.00
CW statistic 0.96 1.26 -1.03 -0.37 1.42 * 0.09 0.70 0.71
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.96
CW statistic 0.34 0.69 2.05 ** 1.95 ** 0.83 1.57 *
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 1.00 1.02 0.93 0.97 1.00 0.99
CW statistic 0.10 -0.76 2.59 *** 2.19 ** -0.27 1.21
Panel B: Domestic variables 
5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years
Panel A: Global variables
5-years 15-years
Bond maturity Bond maturity Bond maturity
Brazil Mexico Philippines Turkey
Bond maturity
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TABLE 8. BENCHMARKING THE PREDICTIVE ABILITY IN THE EXTENDED POST-LEHMAN PERIOD 
 
The first row in panel A reports the RMSE of the benchmark random walk (RW) and slope-regression (SR) models. Subsequent rows show the ratio of RMSEs of model and 
benchmark at hand. A ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the model reduces forecasts errors versus the benchmark. Significance of the forecast accuracy gains is assessed with 
the Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean squared errors; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 = 0 vs. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** 
is rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. The baseline model, Eq. (4), uses the credit spread curve (level, slope and curvature) factors as predictors. Model G1 
adds the U.S. yield curve factors. G2 adds the U.S. short-term interest rate volatility. GEM1 adds the country rating. GEM2 adds trade balance. GEM3 further adds volatility 
of trade balance. GEM4 adds terms-of-trade growth. GEM5 adds volatility of terms-of-term growth. Table 2 lists all the models. Estimation is based on weekly data and the 
forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter-ahead). Bond maturity is τ = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is July 30, 2013 to December 31, 2015 (127 forecasts).  
 
Model
Benchmark RMSE 63.0 70.4 61.9 60.6 22.5 23.1 26.3 37.0 20.4 26.6 25.5 27.9 50.4 55.2 46.3 52.2
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.91 0.81 1.02 1.04 0.89 0.87 1.07 0.76 1.10 0.84 0.91 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.95 0.84
DM stat. 2.42 ** 2.52 ** -0.56 -1.06 2.77 *** 1.34 -0.92 5.95 *** -1.28 1.09 0.80 1.01 1.94 * 3.51 *** 0.64 2.41 **
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.92 0.82 1.06 1.08 0.97 0.94 1.12 0.80 1.08 0.83 1.02 0.93 1.15 1.05 1.19 1.06
DM stat. 1.40 1.91 * -1.42 -1.64 0.61 0.53 -1.44 5.20 *** -1.16 1.31 -0.17 0.42 -1.25 -0.47 -1.85 -0.58
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.87 0.78 1.03 1.05 0.96 0.93 1.06 0.76 1.09 0.84 0.98 0.89 0.99 0.91 0.87 0.90
DM stat. 1.71 * 1.93 * -0.53 -1.02 0.82 0.59 -0.97 5.76 *** -1.32 1.25 0.19 0.70 0.08 0.99 1.72 * 1.11
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 0.86 0.77 1.02 1.04 0.98 0.95 1.06 0.75 1.09 0.84 0.98 0.89 1.07 0.97 1.07 0.95
DM stat. 1.81 * 1.99 ** -0.44 -0.98 0.42 0.41 -0.88 5.89 *** -1.22 1.20 0.18 0.68 -0.79 0.32 -1.01 0.68
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.83 0.74 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.97 1.03 0.73 1.09 0.92 1.04 0.93 0.90 0.82 0.95 0.84
DM stat. 1.77 * 1.93 * 0.00 -0.48 0.08 0.24 -0.47 5.64 *** -2.20 0.63 -0.14 0.47 0.82 1.78 * 0.58 1.80 *
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.80 0.72 0.93 0.95 1.06 1.03 1.10 0.78 0.97 0.89 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.95 0.84
DM stat. 1.62 1.83 * 0.62 0.52 -0.86 -0.23 -1.41 3.36 *** -1.27 0.87 -0.15 0.46 0.75 1.37 0.52 1.36
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.80 0.72 0.93 0.95 0.99 0.96 1.07 0.76 0.90 0.82 0.91 0.80
DM stat. 1.59 1.80 * 0.62 0.53 0.17 0.28 -1.09 3.54 *** 0.75 1.36 0.74 1.53
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.81 0.72 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.90 1.05 0.75 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.80
DM stat. 1.52 1.76 * 0.46 0.34 1.46 0.85 -0.71 3.76 *** 0.74 1.35 0.79 1.56
RW SR
Panel A: Baseline and global variables
Panel B: Domestic variables
RW SR RW SR RW SR
5-year spread 15-year spread
RW SR RW SR RW SR RW SR
Brazil Mexico Philippines Turkey
5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread 15-year spread
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FIGURE A1. CREDIT SPREADS AND LAGGED MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY INDICATORS 
The graphs plot the 5-year credit spread of Mexico and Turkey together with the 13-week lagged U.S. short-term 
interest rate volatility (Panel I) and 13-week lagged country trade balance volatility (Panel II) in 5-year lengthpre-
Lehman and post-Lehman periods. U.S. short-term interest rate (trade balance) volatility is scaled by 2.0 (0.1) 
pre-Lehman and 12 (0.1) post-Lehman. The vertical line marks the start of the forecast evaluation period. The 
sampling frequency is weekly from July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2013. 
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TABLE A1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CREDIT SPREADS AND PREDICTIVE VARIABLES: POST-LEHMAN EXTENDED 
 
The table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and 1st-order autocorrelation of 5- and 15-year 
bond spreads, and candidate predictors used in hierarchical regressions. Table 2 lists all the models. The betas 
are level, slope and curvature of the U.S. yield curve (US) and credit spread curve (Brazil, Mexico, Philippines 
and Turkey) extracted from cross-sections of bond prices sampled at the weekly frequency. σf short is the standard 
deviation of the U.S. short-term interest rate over the most recent 10-week period.CR is country risk. TB is trade 
balance. ∆TT is year-on-year terms of trade growth. σTB (σ∆TT) is the standard deviation of TB (∆TT) over the 
most recent 6-month period. The extended post-Lehman period is December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015 (367 
weeks). 
Variable Variable
β f ,0 0.043 0.008 0.027 0.058 0.986
β f ,1 -0.028 0.013 -0.053 -0.004 0.981
β f ,2 -0.079 0.025 -0.139 -0.022 0.978
σ f short 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.977
ѕ(5) 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.050 0.973 ѕ(5) 0.016 0.010 0.005 0.067 0.989
ѕ(15) 0.022 0.009 0.010 0.056 0.976 ѕ(15) 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.051 0.977
β 0 0.025 0.010 0.012 0.061 0.974 β 0 0.021 0.007 0.008 0.042 0.954
β 1 -0.011 0.020 -0.061 0.062 0.887 β 1 -0.008 0.017 -0.042 0.080 0.913
β 2 -0.025 0.040 -0.154 0.069 0.925 β 2 -0.009 0.039 -0.151 0.159 0.945
CR 39.196 3.146 32.500 45.500 0.978 CR 43.157 2.267 36.000 46.500 0.991
TB 0.067 0.081 -0.159 0.379 0.978 TB -0.258 0.184 -0.595 0.293 0.976
σTB 0.054 0.027 0.021 0.157 0.990 σTB 0.154 0.060 0.077 0.337 0.988
∆ TT 0.052 8.790 -13.276 19.361 0.997
σ∆ TT 2.747 1.560 0.389 8.899 0.991
ѕ(5) 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.047 0.972 ѕ(5) 0.025 0.009 0.013 0.073 0.964
ѕ(15) 0.019 0.006 0.011 0.045 0.950 ѕ(15) 0.027 0.008 0.014 0.062 0.967
β 0 0.021 0.006 0.013 0.044 0.930 β 0 0.029 0.008 0.013 0.063 0.961
β 1 -0.009 0.014 -0.044 0.024 0.874 β 1 -0.007 0.017 -0.055 0.061 0.797
β 2 -0.021 0.032 -0.086 0.063 0.930 β 2 -0.006 0.030 -0.124 0.127 0.796
CR 40.289 1.908 35.500 43.000 0.978 CR 33.740 2.550 27.000 37.500 0.981
TB -0.033 0.071 -0.272 0.085 0.958 TB -0.816 0.227 -1.253 -0.202 0.993
σTB 0.066 0.032 0.024 0.135 0.992 σTB 0.110 0.041 0.042 0.209 0.989
∆ TT -2.778 9.850 -22.243 19.394 0.998 ∆ TT 0.857 4.350 -8.864 9.667 0.995
σ∆ TT 3.609 2.973 0.356 14.099 0.994 σ∆ TT 1.732 1.183 0.241 5.320 0.993
Turkey
Mean StDev Min Max AR(1)AR(1)
Philippines
CountryCountry Mean StDev Min Max
US
Brazil
Mexico
TABLE A2  
BENCHMARKING THE PREDICTIVE MODELS DURING THE EXTENDED POST-LEHMAN PERIOD  
 
The first row in Panel A reports the RMSE of the benchmark random walk (RW) and slope-regression (SR) predictive models. Subsequent rows report the ratio of RMSEs 
of the model at hand to the benchmark. A ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the model brings a forecast error reduction versus the benchmark. Significance of the forecast 
accuracy gains is assessed with the Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean squared error; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 =0 vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. The baseline model, Eq. (4), exploits the credit spread curve 
factors. The models G2 to GEM5 are those used in the previous analysis (as listed in Table 2) but without the U.S. yield curve factors as predictors. Estimation is based 
on weekly data and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter-ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is July 30, 2013 to December 
31, 2015 (127 forecasts). 
Model
Benchmark RMSE 63.0 70.4 61.9 60.6 22.5 23.1 26.3 37.0 20.4 26.6 25.5 27.9 50.4 55.2 46.3 52.2
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.91 0.81 1.02 1.04 0.89 0.87 1.07 0.76 1.10 0.84 0.91 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.95 0.84
DM stat. 2.42 ** 2.52 ** -0.56 -1.06 2.77 *** 1.34 -0.92 5.95 *** -1.28 1.09 0.80 1.01 1.94 * 3.51 *** 0.64 2.41 **
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.88 0.78 1.00 1.02 0.92 0.90 0.99 0.71 1.06 0.82 1.04 0.95 0.79 0.72 0.87 0.77
DM stat. 2.11 ** 2.23 ** 0.08 -0.38 1.61 0.98 0.16 5.57 *** -0.84 1.29 -0.27 0.30 2.63 ** 3.93 *** 1.72 * 3.59 ***
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 0.87 0.78 1.00 1.02 0.91 0.88 1.00 0.71 0.98 0.75 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.77 0.92 0.81
DM stat. 2.18 ** 2.28 ** 0.10 -0.36 1.76 * 1.14 -0.02 5.96 *** 0.31 1.88 * 0.50 0.82 2.12 ** 3.81 *** 1.13 3.73 ***
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.79 0.71 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.69 1.08 0.83 0.97 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.96 0.85
DM stat. 2.24 ** 2.24 ** 0.49 0.18 1.40 0.95 0.51 5.76 *** -0.83 1.27 0.24 0.64 1.43 2.55 ** 0.35 1.54
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.77 0.69 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.93 1.04 0.74 0.97 0.74 1.02 0.93 0.78 0.71 0.90 0.80
DM stat. 1.86 * 1.99 ** 0.90 0.86 0.52 0.51 -0.59 4.02 *** 0.39 2.08 ** -0.15 0.36 1.66 * 2.49 ** 0.84 1.87 *
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.77 0.69 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.91 1.04 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.82 0.73
DM stat. 1.86 * 1.99 ** 1.04 1.02 0.85 0.73 -0.62 3.86 *** 1.77 * 2.58 ** 1.47 2.35 **
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.68 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.87 1.01 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.79 0.70
DM stat. 1.81 * 1.95 * 0.98 0.94 1.65 1.04 -0.21 4.36 *** 1.69 * 2.37 ** 1.70 * 2.43 **
Brazil Mexico
15-year spread5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread
RW SR RW
Philippines Turkey
5-year spread 15-year spread 5-year spread 15-year spread
SRRW SR RW SR RW SR
Panel B: Domestic variables
RW SR
Panel A: Baseline and global variables
RW SRRW SR
